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defining required request laws. Of the forty-one states that have passed such laws during the past three years,
approximately, half have enacted strong required request policies. These states have mandated that hospital
administrators be responsible for insuring that next-of-kin or legal guardians are asked about their willingness
to donate organs and tissues of the deceased when a death has been pronounced in a hospital setting.
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Professional Arrogance and 
Public Misunderstanding 
by Arthur L Caplan 
y assessment of the impact of required request 
legislation on organ and tissue procurement must 
begin by defining required request laws. Of the forty- 
one states that have passed such laws during the 
past three years, approximately half have enacted 
strong required request policies. These states have 
mandated that hospital administrators be respon- 
sible for insuring that next-of-kin or legal guardians 
are asked about their willingness to donate organs 
and tissues of the deceased when a death has been 
pronounced in a hospital setting. 
Most strong required request laws, such as those 
enacted by Oregon, New York, Massachusetts, and 
New Jersey, allow a person other than a physician 
to be designated to make requests. These laws also 
call for documentation that a request was made and 
require health departments to facilitate implemen- 
tation of the legislation by assisting hospitals in 
educating their staffs and by monitoring the impact 
of required request legislation on the overall 
availability of organs and tissues for transplantation. 
In only one state, Kentucky, is there explicit mention 
of a penalty for failure to comply with required 
request legislation. 
The federal government and roughly twenty states 
have enacted laws that differ in important respects 
from strong required request legislation. Federal law 
as well as the laws in states such as California and 
Tennessee mandate that hospitals create protocols 
through which next-of-kin or legal guardians will 
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be notified about the possibility of donating organs 
or tissues. These "weak required request laws leave 
the details of requests and monitoring to individual 
hospitals. Perhaps the most significant difference, 
however, is that the federal law, which became 
effective in November 1987, links the creation of 
a donor protocol to continued eligibility for receiving 
monies from the Medicare program. 
Because of these substantial variations, assessing 
the impact of required request legislation is 
complicated. Moreover, many state laws have been 
in effect for as little as a year or less. The federal 
law is simply too new to permit any reliable estimate 
of its impact on either hospital practices regarding 
organ and tissue procurement or on the overall 
availability of organs and tissues for transplantation. 
The fact that required request laws have not been 
enacted in a social policy vacuum makes this task 
all the more complex. Many states have enacted laws 
mandating that occupants of automobiles and other 
vehicles wear seatbelts. Others have raised the legal 
age for purchasing alcohol and/or stiffened 
penalties for drunk driving. Still others have lowered 
the legal maximum speed for vehicular traffic. Since 
automobile and motorcycle accidents account for 
a large proportion of those persons whose kidneys, 
hearts, and other vital organs could be used for 
transplantation, changes in these laws have a direct 
impact on the number of persons who die each 
year who might serve as organ or tissue donors. 
For example, traffic accident fatalities in Minnesota 
have declined 10 percent in 198'7 from the numbers 
recorded in 1986. Seat belt laws in Great Britain 
are believed to have brought about a 15 percent 
decrease in fatalities from accidents. 
Yet no reliable data exist on the actual number 
of persons who could have donated an organ or 
a kidney. For all these reasons, it is hard to know 
exactly how to respond to anecdotal reports 
concerning the impact of required request on the 
overall supply of organs and tissues. 
My associates and I at the Center for Biomedical 
Ethics at the University of Minnesota are currently 
conducting a telephone survey of ten states in which 
required request laws of one kind or another have 
been in effect for more than six months. We have 
contacted organ procurement agencies, health 
department officials, and representatives of regional 
eyebanks to obtain whatever information they can 
offer concerning the impact of the new laws. 
None of the ten states, including many with 
policies of mandatory reporting to health depart- 
ments, has compiled reliable figures on the number 
of vital organs or tissues available before and after 
the enactment of required request legislation. 
However, those surveyed do report several trends 
and problems with required request that shed some 
light on the impact of state laws. 
Tissue donation, including corneas, skin, bone, 
dural tissues, and tendons, has increased dramat- 
ically since the enactment of required request laws. 
Increases on the order of 200 to 300 percent are 
common. While impressive, these numbers ought 
to be even greater given the large number of persons 
who could donate tissue upon their deaths. 
Organ donation has increased from 10 to 20 
percent in many states. In others there has been 
no increase over the numbers of vital organs 
available for transplant prior to required request 
laws. The fact that organ donation has remained 
constant despite significant decreases in traffic 
fatalities provides some evidence that the laws have 
had a small positive impact on the supply of organs 
available for transplantion. 
The primary problem cited by organ procurement 
officials, eyebank representatives, and health 
department officials has been the inadequacy of 
educational efforts directed toward health care 
professionals. As one organ procurement official 
observed, "if you simply ask relatives about organ 
donation by citing the law the consent rate is zero." 
No state has provided even a minimally adequate 
level of professional education to those who bear 
the obligation of making requests for organ 
donation. Whether physicians, nurses, or others, 
those responsible for asking need training in making 
these exceedingly emotion-laden requests. 
The other major obstacle noted by the majority 
of procurement officials and state health department 
representatives is resistance by physicians to 
complying with the new laws. Rates of compliance 
in many states do not exceed 50 percent Physician 
noncompliance appears to be primarily a result of 
the resentment held by physicians against nonphy- 
sicians, most specifically legislators and bureaucrats, 
about being told what they must do.As several health 
department officials commented, physicians are not 
comfortable requesting organ donation from family 
members and are even less comfortable when 
confronted by yet another governmental attempt to 
regulate the practice of medicine. 
One might interpret the problem of physician 
noncompliance with required request laws, be they 
strong or weak, as evidence supporting Martyn, 
Wright, and Clark's position concerning moral, 
clinical, and legal problems with required request 
legislation. While physicians often do not want to 
ask about organ donation, whether the law requires 
it or not, very little in the arguments presented by 
Martyn, Wright, and Clark about ethical problems 
with required request is persuasive. 
Their critique of required request legislation is 
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prompted by what turns out to be, on closer 
examination, several inaccuracies. The authors 
maintain that "institutionalizing the identification of 
potential organ donors appears to assume a shift 
in the physician's clinical attitude SO that willingness 
to diagnose or even hasten the diagnosis of brain 
death supersedes the incentive to fight for life." It 
is hard to imagine a claim about required request 
that could be farther from the truth. 
In general, both strong and weak versions of 
required request laws were enacted as amendments 
to -existing *uniform Anatomical Gift legislation. 
Strong required request laws are quite specific about 
the fact that no requests are to be made until death 
has been pronounced. Such versions of the law do 
nothing to alter a physician's traditional obligation 
to provide care as long as the patient can possibly 
benefit. Weak required request laws allow individual 
hospitals complete discretion as to the nature of 
their protocols for notifying family members of the 
option of donation. In neither situation are the 
standard requirements for separating the roles of 
those who provide treatment and those who 
pronounce death in any way altered or weakened. 
Moreover, the legal climate pervading American 
medicine is hardly conducive to efforts to hasten 
death or fudge a brain death diagnosis to obtain 
an organ or tissue donor, particularly given the fact 
that potential recipients are either unknown or 
nearly always awaiting an organ at a different 
hospital. Physicians have little economic or 
psychological motivation to become involved in time- 
consuming and resource-intensive efforts to recover 
organs or tissues when the beneficiaries of their 
efforts are likely to be transplant teams and their 
patients at other hospitals in other states. It is, 
therefore, ludicrous to argue that doctors will be 
compelled by required request legislation to kill or 
murder helpless patients when many of them find 
organ procurement a nuisance simply on the 
grounds of professional autonomy or the absence 
of adequate fiscal or psychological rewards. 
The authors also suggest that required request 
legislation is morally suspect in that it encourages 
dehumanization of the dead, who come to be viewed 
only as portable organ and tissue banks. There is 
not a smidgen of empirical evidence, anecdotal or 
otherwise, mustered in support of this thesis. In 
addition, if this claim were true, it would stand as 
a convincing argument against all forms of organ 
procurement, whether inspired by required request 
legislation or any other public policy. If health care 
professionals are actually put in an untenable moral 
bind due to a genuine "conflict between encouraging 
hope (through caregiving) and causing the family 
to lose hope (through the donation request)," then 
In enacting required request legslation, our 
socie@ h & ~indicated its collectiue desire t b t  
giuen the option of organ 
and tissuedonation as a last act of for 
the dead and their families and as an expression 
of concern for those who will die unless more 
Organs and tissuesare made 
no form of organ request is ethically acceptable. 
Similarly, assertions about physician insensitivity 
to families' needs "to express feelings about the 
relationship now lost [as a result of the death of 
a loved one]" impugn all forms of soliciting organs 
and tissues no matter how tolerant they may be of 
professional hesitation about making requests. The 
authors fail to perceive that required request will 
more likely enable families to make informed 
choices about organ donation. The requirement of 
a request will allow those who are living to anticipate 
the request in advance of a tragedy and make their 
wishes known to family members. The routinization 
of requests by properly educated health care 
personnel enhances the likelihood of autonomous 
choice over the haphazard sorts of inquiries that 
preceeded the enactment of required request 
legislation. 
Further, there is absolutely no evidence to warrant 
the authors' view that families "reconstruct the events 
surrounding a death in the weeks, months, and years 
that follow" and "feel that organ donation involved 
treating their loved one as object not subject." The 
anecdotal evidence that does exist supports a quite 
different conclusion. 
Organ procurement personnel have repeatedly 
indicated that many families express regret weeks, 
months, and even years later at not having 
considered the option of organ donation, not having 
acted on the stated wishes of their deceased loved 
one to donate, or having refused a request for 
donation. What donor families do desire is to know 
what happened as a result of the donation. Often 
such follow-up information is not provided in a 
timely manner to donor families. 
The final inaccuracy is a true howler. Martyn, 
Wright, and Clark maintain that in other countries 
required request laws "were the first step toward 
presumed consent laws." Required request laws are 
portrayed as the "edge of the wedge" by which 
Hastings Center Report, April/May 1988 
voluntarism and altruism will be replaced by the 
totalitarianism of state mandated beneficence. This 
is sheer nonsense. 
None of the fifteen nations that have presumed 
consent laws (including most recently Singapore, 
which enacted such a law in the fall of 1987) have 
previously had any form of required request 
legislation. Prior to 1986, the United States was the 
only nation to have enacted or even debated a 
required request law. While one Canadian province 
has enacted required request legislation and some 
other nations, such as the United Kingdom and The 
Netherlands, are considering proposals, no nation 
has moved from a policy of requiring requests to 
taking organs and tissues by legislative fiat. 
Required request laws emerged as a distinct 
alternative to, not a preamble for, presumed consent. 
Indeed, many who favored presumed consent laws 
for the United States viewed required request as a 
step backward rather than as a first step on the road 
to their desired public policy objective. Whatever the 
ethical case for presumed consent laws, required 
request as a public policy approach consciously 
reflects a sensitivity to the key values of voluntarism, 
altruism, and informed choice that have formed the 
core of American moral and legal thinking about 
organ and tissue procurement since the creation 
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in 1968. 
The most persuasive argument that Martyn, 
Wright, and Clark are able to muster against required 
request legislation is that if the laws are effective 
they will have adverse fiscal consequences. Trans- 
plants are expensive and if they are financed by 
public funds there will be less money available to 
meet the legitimate health care needs of others. 
But is the cost of having a greater supply of organs 
and tissues available for transplant really a reason 
not to try and obtain organs and tissues? Should 
the answer to such a question hinge on cost, or, 
rather, on the steps needed to assure access to 
efficacious medical care for all Americans with 
medical needs? 
If overall expenditure is the standard by which 
our moral obligation to those with terminal illness 
is to be measured then many other Americans will 
have to yield their access to medical care to others. 
Those with AIDS, terminal cancers, head injuries, 
spinal cord injuries, and severe congenital anomalies 
impose a far greater burden on the national treasury 
than anything organ and tissue transplants could 
pose under even the most optimistic scenarios 
concerning required request. Surely the correct 
ethical answer to public policy regarding organ and 
tissue procurement is to seek ways to reduce the 
costs of transplants rather than to ignore the fact 
that thousands of Americans die or remain severely 
disabled simply for want of an organ or tissue donor. 
Martyn, Wright, and Clark conclude their critique 
of required request with a call for a redirection of 
efforts to educate the American public about organ 
and tissue donation. Public education is surely 
commendable, but it has little to do with the primary 
difficulties confronting required request laws. The 
major problems are the unavailability of data on 
the size of the pool of organ and tissue donors, 
the failure of states and the federal government to 
support legislation with adequate professional 
education, and the failure of the transplant 
community to address the audience most in need 
of education and persuasion where matters of organ 
and tissue donation are concerned-health care 
professionals. 
The transplant community has taken great solace 
over the years in the view that the public's lack of 
awareness and understanding of organ and tissue 
donation is the primary obstacle to broader support 
for organ procurement. But if opinion surveys are 
to be believed, the public knows fill well about the 
need for transplants. 
The public continues to evince a strong interest 
in organ and tissue donation although that interest 
has declined somewhat in recent years. This may 
result from a sudden onslaught of ignorance but, 
I believe that rather than moral callousness on the 
part of the citizenry, other factors are responsible, 
factors far more disquieting to the transplant 
community. 
It is health care professionals, not the general 
public, who are in desperate need of education about 
their duties where organ and tissue procurement 
is concerned. They need to be taught how to make 
requests, or, if they are too discomfitted by death, 
to yield authority over matters pertaining to 
procurement to others more adept at dealing with 
this harsh reality. 
In enacting required request legislation, our 
society has indicated its collective desire that people 
routinely be given the option of organ and tissue 
donation as a last act of respect for the dead and 
their families and as an expression of concern for 
those who will die unless more organs and tissues 
are made available. It has not yet put its money 
where its ethical concerns are in the form of 
resources to train health care professionals to feel 
comfortable rather than angry in discharging their 
obligations to the dead and those who are dying. 
Until these resources are forthcoming and directed 
to the audience of health care professionals where 
they are most needed, the ethical, clinical, and legal 
impact of required request will remain unknown. 
